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INTRODUCTION  
 This case is not as messy as it may seem.  It is actually rather 
straightforward. 
Scott Bell built a home using Jordan Construction as the general contractor.  
Bell did not pay Jordan Construction in full, and so it recorded a mechanic’s lien 
and brought a foreclosure action against Bell.  Jordan Construction could have, 
but did not, name the trust deed holder (FNMA’s predecessor-in-interest) in the 
foreclosure action.   
Jordan Construction got summary judgment against Bell and was granted 
a writ of attachment against the property.  A sheriff’s sale was set.  But FNMA, 
having purchased the trustee’s deed at a foreclosure sale after Bell defaulted on 
his mortgage, objected to the sheriff’s sale because (1) Bell no longer had any 
interest in the property; and (2) the priority of Jordan Construction’s mechanic’s 
lien versus FNMA’s trustee’s deed had never been determined.  The district 
court halted the sheriff’s sale.  Jordan Construction then filed a third-party 
complaint against FNMA, seeking to foreclose on the mechanic’s lien against 
FNMA’s trustee’s deed. 
In short, this case is a simple priority dispute—Jordan Construction’s 
mechanic’s lien versus FNMA’s trustee’s deed—with a few appendages growing 
out of that dispute.   
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FNMA prevailed below on essentially all the issues that were disputed.  
First, the district court correctly concluded that the second amendment to the 
mechanic’s lien—which nearly doubled the amount of the lien—was invalid 
under the mechanic’s lien statute because it was filed more than 180 days after 
the certificate of occupancy was issued.  This conclusion was based, in part, on 
Jordan Construction’s admission that a certificate of occupancy was issued in 
October 2008.  Jordan Construction did not attempt to withdraw that admission 
until long after discovery was closed.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying that request, especially because the admission was 
consistent with undisputed facts.     
Second, the district court correctly concluded that the 2008 mechanic’s lien 
chapter, which is applicable to this case, did not provide for prejudgment interest 
on mechanic’s liens.  This Court recently held the same thing.  See 2 Ton 
Plumbing, L.L.C. v. Thorgaard, 2015 UT 29. 
Third, the district court correctly concluded that FNMA was not bound by 
the interlocutory findings and conclusions entered against Bell earlier in the case.  
Jordan Construction argues on appeal that both a lis pendens and res judicata 
precluded FNMA from challenging the validity or priority of the mechanic’s lien 
and an award of prejudgment interest, because it had already obtained rulings 
on those issues against Bell before FNMA became a party.  But neither res judicata 
xi 
nor the lis pendens supports that argument.  One prerequisite for being bound by 
res judicata or a lis pendens is a final judgment.  True, by the time FNMA entered 
this case Jordan Construction had already obtained certain interlocutory rulings 
against Bell, but the district court later altered those rulings before issuing its 
final judgment in favor of FNMA.  Res judicata and the lis pendens don’t have any 
legal relevance to interlocutory rulings that are later superseded by the final 
judgment.  Further, res judicata requires that FNMA be in privity with Bell, and it 
was not.  As discussed below, the relevant doctrine is “law of the case,” which 
fully authorized the district court to reconsider and revise its prior rulings once 
FNMA became a party and established the validity of its positions.   
Jordan Construction could and should have prevented all of this by simply 
naming the holder of the trust deed as a party to its foreclosure action when it 
was filed.  In fact, that is the only way that interest could have been foreclosed.     
Because FNMA did have the right to contest the validity and priority of 
Jordan Construction’s mechanic’s lien versus its trustee’s deed, this is, once 
again, a simple dispute with three main issues:  (1) the timeliness of the second 
amendment to the mechanic’s lien, (2) whether prejudgment interest is available 
on a mechanic’s lien foreclosure claim, and (3) attorney’s fees for the prevailing 
party.  As demonstrated in this brief. FNMA prevails on all these issues.  The 
decision below should be affirmed.  
xii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 Jurisdiction exists under Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue 1:  Whether the district court erred by quashing the writ of execution 
and halting the sheriff’s sale so that FNMA could challenge the validity and 
priority of the mechanic’s lien.           
 Standard of Review:  A trial court’s decision to reconsider a prior ruling is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 
2008 UT 73, ¶ 27.  Likewise, “[a] trial court's determination of whether a party 
should be joined to an action will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”  
Cent. Utah Water Conservancy Dist. v. Upper East Union Irrigation Co., 2013 UT 
67, ¶ 57.         
 Issue 2:  Whether FNMA is bound by the findings and conclusions entered 
against Scott Bell because of the lis pendens or the doctrine of res judicata.    
 Standard of Review:   “The ultimate determination of whether res 
judicata bars an action is a question of law, which we review for correctness.”  
Press Pub., Ltd. v. Matol Botanical Int’l, Ltd., 2001 UT 106, ¶ 19 (internal 
quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted).     
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 Issue 3:  Whether Jordan Construction should have been allowed to 
withdraw its admission that a certificate of occupancy was issued in October 
2008.           
 Standard of Review:  A district court’s decision to deny a motion to 
withdraw is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.  Langeland v. Monarch 
Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1998). 
 Issue 4:  Whether prejudgment interest is awarded under a mechanic’s 
lien.  
 Standard of Review:  “‘A trial court's decision to grant or deny 
prejudgment interest presents a question of law which we review for 
correctness.’” Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ¶ 16(quoting Cornia v. 
Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995)). 
Issue 5:  Whether the district court abused its discretion by awarding 
attorney’s fees to FNMA as the prevailing party.    
Standard of Review: “We … review the trial court’s determination as to 
who was the prevailing party under an abuse of discretion standard.”  R.T. 
Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ¶ 25.  
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The determinative provisions are properly set forth in the Appellant’s 
Brief.   
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 Nature of the Case:  This is a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action.  Third-
party plaintiff, Jordan Construction, was the general contractor on a home built 
for Scott Bell.  (R.431, 434.)  When the home went over budget and Bell failed to 
pay, Jordan Construction recorded a mechanic’s lien and sued Bell.  (R.1071.)  
Jordan Construction obtained summary judgment against Bell.  (R.500-03.)  
Jordan Construction then filed a third-party complaint against Federal National 
Mortgage Association, which had earlier purchased the trustee’s deed in a 
nonjudicial foreclosure.  Jordan Construction alleged that FNMA was bound by 
the summary judgment against Bell and, alternatively, that its mechanic’s lien 
was valid and had priority over FNMA’s trustee’s deed.  (R.1048-54.)   
 Course of Proceedings and Rulings Below:  The course of proceedings 
and the district court’s rulings on substantive issues constitute the bulk of the 
relevant “facts” on appeal and thus are included within the following “statement 
of facts.”   
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 In 2006, Scott Bell, an employee of Jordan Construction, hired Jordan 
Construction as general contractor to build him a new home.  (R.439.)  Jordan 
Construction would be responsible to pay the subcontractors.  (R.439.)  Visible 
work began on the home no later than October 16, 2006.  (R.1557.)  
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 On January 31, 2008, Bell obtained long-term financing and executed a 
promissory note secured by a trust deed in favor of The Mortgage Co-op.  (R.909-
921.)  The trust deed was recorded on February 5, 2008.  (R.546.)     
 Bell moved into the home before it was done, so on March 18, 2008, Provo 
City recorded a “Certificate of Non-compliance,” which stated that the property 
“has been occupied without an approved final [inspection] and a Certificate of 
Occupancy ….”  (R.3388.)  After the work was completed, a final inspection was 
done on October 16, 2008.  (R.3209)  On October 21, 2008, Provo City recorded a 
Notice of Certificate of Compliance which stated:  “As of October 21, 2008 the 
project passed the Final Inspection.  A Certificate of Occupancy has been issued.”  
(R.3388.) 
 Bell failed to pay Jordan Construction and some subcontractors what he 
owed.  (R.3945.)  In late October or early November 2008, Jordan Construction 
fired Bell.1  (R.3945.)  On November 24, 2008, Scott Bell and his brother, Todd, 
who was also employed by Jordan Construction, sued Jordan Construction and 
its owner, Wayne Lewis, in the Fourth District Court alleging conversion, 
                                                 
1 Jordan Construction gives a lengthy recitation of facts related to Bell’s 
dishonesty, including his embezzlement from Jordan Construction, and the time 
it took to uncover Bell’s dishonesty.  For purposes of this appeal, FNMA does not 
dispute these facts, and they do provide some context and background.  But they 
are not material to the outcome of this appeal.   
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embezzlement, breach of contract, slander, trespass, and intentional interference 
with business relations.  (R.1-15.)   
On December 5, 2008, Jordan Construction recorded a mechanic’s lien 
against Bell’s home for $126,957.00.  (R.1071.)  The lien was amended on 
December 15, 2008 to correct a minor error.  (R.49-50)  On December 16, 2008, 
Jordan Construction filed counterclaims in the Fourth District Court against Scott 
Bell for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, conversion, 
and foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien.  (R.23-45.)  At the same time, Jordan 
Construction recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens. (R.53-54.)  Although there was a 
trust deed recorded against the property at the time, the trust deed holder was 
not named as a party to the foreclosure action.  (R.23-45.)    
Various subcontractors also recorded mechanic’s liens.  (R.2895.)  Jordan 
Construction paid those subcontractors and their liens were released.  (R.2895.)  
Other subcontractors did not record liens but did submit invoices to Jordan 
Construction for unpaid work. (R.2895-96.)  Jordan Construction paid off all the 
subcontractors and then, on July 27, 2009, amended its lien to add the amounts it 
had paid to the subcontractors, increasing the amount from $126,957.00 to 
$232.976.81.  (R.2895-98.)                
On January 7, 2010, Jordan Construction moved for partial summary 
judgment against Bell.  (R.406-428.)  Bell did not file an opposition.  (R.500.)  
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Jordan Construction’s statement of facts was “deemed admitted by operation of 
Rule 7” (R.864), and on February 5, 2010, the court granted partial summary 
judgment on Jordan Construction’s claims for conversion and breach of contract 
(R.500-03).  The order was silent, however, on the mechanic’s lien foreclosure 
claim.   
On February 16, 2010, Bell filed for bankruptcy.  (R.511.)  The bankruptcy 
court later lifted the stay, and on June 24, 2010, the Fourth District Court entered 
findings and conclusions in support of the partial summary judgment.  (R.510-12; 
529-38.)  The findings and conclusions still said nothing about the mechanic’s 
lien.   
And the trust deed holder still was not a party.  On August 5, 2010, Jordan 
Construction filed a Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint against 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), which had acquired 
the trust deed.  (R.540-41.)  MERS “is a necessary and indispensable party,” 
Jordan Construction explained, “because it has an interest in the property.”  
(R.541.)  Joining MERS was necessary “in order to determine priority regarding 
liens which are attached to the property.”  (R.541.)  The proposed third-party 
complaint sought a declaration that Jordan Construction’s mechanic’s lien had 
priority over MERS’s trust deed.  (R.544-48.)  The court granted the motion, and 
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Jordan Construction filed the third-party complaint, but never served it.  (R.575-
76.)  Thus, the trust deed still was not made subject to the foreclosure.      
 Meanwhile, Bell defaulted on the promissory note secured by the trust 
deed and on October 1, 2010, a nonjudicial foreclosure occurred, at which FNMA 
purchased the trustee’s deed for $442,431.96.  (R.923-29.)    
On January 21, 2011, Jordan Construction filed an Application for a Writ of 
Execution, requesting permission for the sheriff to seize and sell Bell’s home in 
satisfaction of Jordan Construction’s partial summary judgment against Bell.  
(R.729-35.)  The application does not mention the mechanic’s lien but instead 
appears to be an attempt to collect on the “judgment” against Bell on the 
conversion and contract claims.2  A notice was sent to FNMA (R.999-1013), but it 
did not object, and on April 14, 2011, the district court issued the writ (R.747-48).  
The writ also makes no mention of the mechanic’s lien.       
In any case, Jordan Construction did not execute that writ.  Instead, on 
June 14, 2011, it filed a motion asking the court to supplement the findings and 
conclusions.  (R.759-60.)  On July 1, 2011, the district court granted the motion, 
explaining that although Jordan Construction had requested summary judgment 
                                                 
2 On December 20, 2010, the Fourth District Court granted a motion setting aside 
a previous partial summary judgment that had been entered in Jordan 
Construction’s favor against Todd Bell. (R.727-28.)  Thus, there will still claims 
pending between Jordan Construction and Todd Bell also.   
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on its mechanic’s lien foreclosure claim, “the ultimate Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order did not include judgment … with respect to the 
mechanic’s lien claim, an oversight which this Court ought to have observed.”  
(R.865.)  The court said that Jordan Construction “did, in fact, prevail” against 
Bell on the mechanic’s lien claim.  (R.865.)  The court also awarded $65,801 in 
attorney’s fees to Jordan Construction against Bell.  (R.865-71; 888-91.)      
On August 3, 2011, the court modified the findings and conclusions to 
state that Jordan Construction “is entitled to a Decree of Foreclosure and Writ of 
Execution directing the Sheriff to sell the property against which the mechanic’s 
lien was recorded ….”  (R.891.)  The order also stated that Jordan Construction is 
entitled to “prejudgment and post-judgment interest along with attorney fees 
and costs,” bringing the total judgment against Bell to $336,568.66.  (R.891.)  
Finally, the court directed Jordan Construction to prepare a “new and revised 
Writ of Execution and Decree of Foreclosure … directing the Sheriff of Utah 
County to conduct a foreclosure sale selling the property against which the 
mechanic’s lien was recorded.”  (R.891.)     
 Jordan Construction did not prepare a new writ, however.  Yet, at Jordan 
Construction’s request, on August 22, 2011, the Utah County Sheriff posted 
notice of a proposed foreclosure sale on September 14, 2011 of “[a]ll right, title, 
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claim and interest of the above named plaintiff [i.e., Scott Bell] and his successor 
in interest” in the property.  (R.953.)   
Having recently acquired the trustee’s deed, on September 6, 2011, FNMA 
filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and Notice of Sale.  (R.893-906.)  On 
September 12, 2011, the court issued an order quashing the writ and granting 
Jordan Construction’s request to file a third-party complaint against FNMA.  
(R.1046-47.)        
On September 21, 2011, Jordan Construction filed a third-party complaint 
against FNMA pleading a single claim seeking a declaration that it could 
foreclose against FNMA’s trusteed deed because FNMA was bound by the 
findings and conclusions entered against Scott Bell earlier in the case.  (R.1048-
54.)  FNMA moved to dismiss the claim because the district court had already 
concluded when it quashed the writ that FNMA was not bound by the findings 
and conclusions entered against Bell.  (R.1093-1106.)  Jordan Construction argued 
there was privity between Bell and FNMA.  (1108-25.)  The court rejected that 
argument and granted FNMA’s motion to dismiss with leave to amend.  
(R.1173.)    
Jordan Construction’s Amended Third Party Complaint, filed on February 
23, 2012, alleged (word-for-word) the same declaratory-judgment claim the court 
had just dismissed (R.1180), but also included a second claim requesting 
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foreclosure on the mechanic’s lien against FNMA’s interest in the property 
(R.1180-81).  The mechanic’s lien claim sought to recover through foreclosure not 
only the amount of the lien, but the full $336,568.66 Jordan Construction had 
been awarded against Bell, including interest and attorney’s fees.  (R.1178.)    
FNMA moved to dismiss the Amended Third Party Complaint.  (R.1255-
56.)  The court again dismissed the declaratory-judgment claim, but rejected 
FNMA’s argument that the lien-foreclosure claim was barred by the statute of 
limitations.  (R.1309-22.)    
FNMA answered the Amended Third Party Complaint on August 24, 
2012.  (R.1324-28.)  A month later, before any discovery, Jordan Construction 
moved for summary judgment.  (R.1330-31; 1498-1500.)  The court granted 
FNMA’s Rule 56(f) motion and Jordan Construction withdrew its motion for 
summary judgment.  (R.2277; 2307-08; 2316-18.) 
On March 7, 2014, after fact discovery ended, FNMA filed a series of 
motions for partial summary judgment.  First was a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Ruling that FNMA is Not Liable for Attorneys’ Fees Judgment Against 
Scott Bell, arguing that the award of costs and fees against Bell was his personal 
debt and not money that Jordan Construction could recover through foreclosure 
on the mechanic’s lien.  (R.2455-62.)  Second was a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment that FNMA is Not Bound by the Judgment or Findings Entered 
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Against Scott Bell, again taking on Jordan Construction’s res judicata argument.  
(R.2475-79.)     
Third was a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Ruling that Jordan 
Construction’s Second Amended Mechanic’s Lien is Invalid, arguing that Jordan 
Construction’s second amendment to the mechanic’s lien was untimely.  (R.2489-
91.)  And fourth was a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Ruling that Jordan 
Construction is Not Entitled to Interest, arguing that the plain language of the 
applicable mechanic’s lien statute “does not permit a mechanic’s lien claimant to 
recover interest on the value of its lien.”  (R.2551.)  On April 15, 2014, Jordan 
Construction filed its own motion for summary judgment, arguing that its 
mechanic’s lien had priority over FNMA’s interest, and (once again) that FNMA 
was bound by the findings and conclusions entered against Bell.  (R.2861-72.)  
The court issued its ruling on July 1, 2014.  (R.3206-26.)  The court granted 
FNMA’s motion regarding the attorney’s fees awarded against Bell.  These fees 
were caused “by Bell, before FNMA was joined as a party,” the court explained, 
and were therefore allocated to Bell to pay.  (R.3220.)  The court also granted 
FNMA’s motion regarding prejudgment interest on its mechanic’s lien claim 
because the 2008 statute did not provide for prejudgment interest.  (R.3221.) 
On the issue of res judicata, the court granted FNMA’s motion and denied 
Jordan Construction’s because there was no privity.  “[H]aving acquired the 
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trustee’s lien,” the court explained, “FNMA has an interest in and an ability to 
litigate the priority of the mechanic’s lien which Bell did not.  Thus, Bell did not 
represent the same legal right which FNMA now seeks to assert.”  (R.3223.)   
That left two issues.  First, the court denied FNMA’s motion regarding the 
timeliness of the second amendment to the mechanic’s lien.  In its opposition, 
Jordan Construction had argued that the second amendment was valid under 
two theories:  substantial compliance and relation back.  (R.2688-90.)  At oral 
argument, however, Jordan Construction made a new argument:  that the second 
amendment was timely because a certificate of occupancy was not issued until 
June 2, 2011.  (R.3219.)  The court said the argument was “improperly raised 
during oral argument” but nevertheless temporarily denied FNMA’s motion 
regarding the timeliness of the second amendment to the lien.  (R.3219-20.)   
 Finally, the court rejected Jordan Construction’s motion for summary 
judgment regarding the priority date of the mechanic’s lien.  The court held that 
there were disputed issues of material fact about whether Jordan Construction 
had abandoned the project for a time, which would prevent the lien from relating 
back to the commencement of the work.  (R.3224-25.)   
 On February 13, 2015, Jordan Construction filed another motion for 
summary judgment, arguing as it had at the previous oral argument that the 
timeliness of the second amendment to the mechanic’s lien should be determined 
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from the issuance of the June 2011 certificate of occupancy.  (R.3246.)  In 
opposition, FNMA pointed to Jordan Construction’s admission that the 
certificate of occupancy was issued in October 2008:    
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that Scott Bell began occupying the 
Property in October 2007. 
RESPONSE: Admit that Scott Bell occupied the property 
pursuant to a temporary occupancy permit beginning in October 
2007.  However, construction on his home was not yet finished, no 
final inspection had been completed and no permanent occupancy 
permit had been issued until October 2008. 
(R.2541.)  Jordan Construction had never moved to amend or withdraw this 
admission.  (R.3327.)  FNMA also pointed to the undisputed evidence that a 
certificate of occupancy was, in fact, issued in October 2008.  On October 21, 
2008, Provo City recorded a Notice of Certificate of Compliance which stated:  
“As of October 21, 2008 the project passed the Final Inspection.  A Certificate of 
Occupancy has been issued.”  (R.3388.)   
 On April 3, 2015, FNMA filed its own motion for partial summary 
judgment, arguing that Jordan Construction’s admission, along with the 
recorded notice that a certificate of occupancy was issued in October 2008, 
conclusively established that fact and required summary judgment in FNMA’s 
favor on the timeliness of the second amendment to the lien. (R.3399-3406.)  
Three days later, Jordan Construction moved to withdraw its admission, and 
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asked the court for time to conduct additional discovery regarding the certificate 
of occupancy.  (R.3474-75; R.3545-46.)  On May 7, 2015, the court denied Jordan 
Construction’s motion to withdraw its admission because the “documentary 
evidence, together with deposition testimony and interrogatories all consistently 
demonstrate that the certificate of occupancy was, in fact, issued in 2008.”  
(R.3809.)  The court also concluded that withdrawal of the admission would 
prejudice FNMA.  (R.3810.)  And the court also denied Jordan Construction’s 
rule 56(f) request to reopen discovery.  (R.3813-19.)  “Defendant has had literally 
years to investigate the missing certificate of occupancy, but has inexplicably 
waited until now to seek additional discovery.”  (R.3817.)    
On June 10, 2015, the court granted FNMA’s motion for summary 
judgment on the timeliness of the second amendment to the lien.  (R.3939-54.)  
The court explained that the amendment was made more than 180 days after the 
2008 certificate of occupancy was issued and rejected Jordan Construction’s 
arguments: “substantial compliance,” and that the amendment should relate 
back to the initial lien filing.  (R.3950-54.)     
The only remaining issue was the validity and priority of the original 
amount of the mechanic’s lien, $126,956.92.  On July 23, 2015, FNMA submitted 
an offer of judgment in the amount of $130,000.  (R.4137-38.)  Jordan 
Construction did not accept the offer.  Rather than incur the continued costs of 
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litigation, FNMA stipulated that the court could “enter an award in favor of 
Jordan Construction” for the original amount of the lien--$126,956.92.  (R.4141-
42.)  But the stipulation specified that this was not “admission by [FNMA3] that 
Jordan Construction” was the “successful party.” (R.4141-42.)   
FNMA had already requested its costs and attorney’s fees.  (R.4008-30.)  
FNMA argued that most of the case had been about the second amendment to 
the lien and, having prevailed on that issue, and on almost every motion that had 
been filed, it was the prevailing party.  (R.4008-30.)  At a hearing on the issue of 
FNMA’s fees, Jordan Construction said it intended to request its fees.  The court 
expressed its surprise “because the court does not know what work Jordan 
Construction is suggesting was done in order to prevail on the first mechanics 
lien.”  (R.4302-03.)  Nevertheless, the court said it would “look at the attorney 
fees issue all at once.”  (R.4302.)  Thus, the court gave “leave to Jordan 
Construction to argue whether it’s the prevailing party on the stipulation” and 
ordered it to submit a fee affidavit within 14 days.  (R.4303.)   
Jordan Construction did not submit its affidavit within 14 days.  (R.4308.)  
FNMA agreed to give Jordan Construction extra time, but Jordan Construction 
still did not file the affidavit.  (R.4308.)  Thus, on November 20, 2015, nearly three 
                                                 
3 At this point, Bank of American Fork had been substituted in for FNMA.  For 
ease in reference, we will continue to refer to FNMA as the defendant.    
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weeks after FNMA’s affidavit was originally due, FNMA filed a request to 
submit.  (R.4307-08.) 
  On November 23, 2015, Jordan Construction submitted the now untimely 
affidavit along with a motion for its fees.  (R.4313-21.)  Jordan Construction 
argued that because of the stipulation it had prevailed on its mechanic’s lien 
foreclosure claim, had achieved 54% or what it originally asked for, and was 
entitled to $204,576 in fees.  (R.4320.)  The district court held that FNMA was the 
prevailing party, however, because Jordan Construction actually only got about 
one-third of what it requested in its complaint against FNMA, and did not 
prevail on any motion to achieve that “pyrrhic” victory, whereas FNMA had 
been successful on a number of motions that had whittled away Jordan 
Construction’s claim.  Thus, the district court awarded FNMA fees and costs in 
the amount of $166,397.65.  (R.4363-64.)   
 On May 4, 2016, the court entered final judgment, with a net award in 
FNMA’s favor for $39,437.73, resulting from an award of fees and costs in favor 
of FNMA in the amount of $166,397.65, offset by the stipulated award in Jordan 
Construction’s favor of $126,956.92.  (R.4498.)  Jordan Construction filed a timely 
notice of appeal on June 1, 2016.  (R.4500-01.)        
 
 
xxviii 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 Jordan Construction raises four primary issues on appeal.  None merits 
reversal: 
 1. Should FNMA have been allowed to challenge the mechanic’s 
lien?  Jordan Construction says no for three reasons:  One, FNMA failed to object 
to the first writ of execution.  But FNMA was not yet a party to the case, and in 
any case, Jordan Construction did not execute that writ.  Instead, it went back to 
the district court to seek amendment of the findings and conclusions and was 
told to issue a new writ.  At that point, FNMA did object and then became a 
party.  A district court has discretion to set aside a sheriff’s sale after it has 
occurred, so it plainly has discretion to halt one before it happens.   
Two, Jordan Construction argues that because it recorded a lis pendens, 
FNMA purchased the trustee’s deed subject to the outcome of the litigation 
against Bell.  But the litigation against Bell was not over when FNMA became a 
party.  The third-party complaint filed against FNMA was a continuation of that 
action.  And because it was a continuation of the same action, under rule 54(b) 
the district court had the right to revise and even reverse any of its previous 
rulings.  And doing so was especially appropriate here where Bell had not 
responded to Jordan Construction’s motion for summary judgment and thus 
disputed facts were deemed admitted.  Also, the lis pendens could only have 
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affected Bell’s interest in the property.  It could not have affected FNMA’s 
trustee’s deed, which was recorded before the lis pendens was filed and was not 
at issue in the case until FNMA was made a party.   
Three, Jordan Construction argues there was privity between FNMA and 
Bell so res judicata bars FNMA’s attempts to challenge the findings and 
conclusions entered against Bell.  But res judicata requires a final judgment in a 
previous case.  FNMA was brought into this case as a third-party defendant 
before final judgment was entered.  And, in any case, Bell and FNMA were never 
in privity, a key requirement of res judicata.  FNMA purchased the trustee’s deed, 
which Bell never held.    
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to allow 
Jordan Construction to withdraw its admission that a certificate of occupancy 
was issued in October 2008?  As noted, the district court concluded that the 
second amendment to Jordan Construction’s mechanic’s lien, which nearly 
doubled its amount, was untimely.  That conclusion was based, in part, on an 
admission by Jordan Construction that a certificate of occupancy was issued in 
October 2008.  The district court denied Jordan Construction’s motion to 
withdraw that admission.  Two conditions must be met before a district court has 
discretion to allow withdrawal of an admission.  The movant must show that the 
admission was contrary to the facts and that withdrawal would not prejudice the 
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other party.  The district court concluded that neither condition was met.  
Undisputed evidence confirms that a certificate of occupancy was, in fact, issued 
in 2008.  And FNMA would have been prejudiced by allowing withdrawal 
because discovery was over, memories had faded, and evidence had been lost.  
But even if these conditions are met, a district court still has discretion to deny 
withdrawal.  The district court did not abuse that discretion here.  Jordan 
Construction had more than two years to withdraw its admission, conduct 
discovery, and challenge the timing of the certificate of occupancy, but 
inexplicably failed to do so.  Discovery was long over and trial was approaching 
when Jordan Construction finally moved to withdraw the admission and reopen 
discovery. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion.   
3. Was prejudgment interest allowed under the 2008 version of the 
mechanic’s lien chapter?  In a recent case, this Court held that mechanic’s lien 
claimants can only recover what the statute expressly allows, which does not 
include interest.  See 2 Ton Plumbing, L.L.C. v. Thorgaard, 2015 UT 29.  
Moreover, in 2012, the Legislature amended the law to allow for interest on a 
mechanic’s lien, thus confirming that it was not previously available.  (This case 
is subject to the 2008 mechanic’s lien statutes.)  The district court correctly 
concluded that prejudgment interest is not awarded on a mechanic’s lien.     
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4. Did the district court abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s 
fees to FNMA as the “successful party”?  In the end, Jordan Construction got 
only about one-third of what it sought ($126,956.92 of $336,568.66), and did not 
prevail on any motion to get even that.  Rather, FNMA simply stipulated rather 
than go to trial.  The district court expressed “surprise” that Jordan Construction 
would even seek its fees.  The district court’s decision to award fees to FNMA 
and not Jordan Construction was not an abuse of discretion.  
ARGUMENT 
I. FNMA did not waive its right to object to the writ of execution.  The 
district court had discretion to consider FNMA’s objection.     
Jordan Construction first argues that the trial court erred in quashing the 
Writ of Execution issued on February 16, 2011, because FNMA waived its right to 
object by not responding to the notice it received.  Aplt. Br. at 21-24.       
A. Jordan Construction did not execute the first writ.  FNMA did 
object to Jordan Construction’s notice of foreclosure. 
Clarity about what actually happened is required.  First, Jordan 
Construction cites cases setting forth the standard for “setting aside” a sheriff’s 
sale.  See, e.g., Meguerditchian v. Smith, 2012 UT App 176, ¶ 9.  Here, the court 
stopped a sheriff’s sale before it happened.     
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Second, the district court did not quash the writ issued on February 16, 
2011—the one that FNMA did not object to.  Jordan Construction never executed 
that writ.  And that writ had nothing to do with the mechanic’s lien.   
Here’s what happened.  On January 21, 2011, Jordan Construction filed an 
Application for a Writ of Execution, which sought permission to execute on Bell’s 
interest in the property to satisfy the award of damages Jordan Construction had 
obtained against Bell.  (R.729-35.)  That award of damages, as set forth in the 
district court’s findings and conclusions, said nothing about the mechanic’s lien.  
At that point, judgment had been entered against Bell only on the conversion and 
breach-of-contract claims.  Thus, the first writ was not a decree of foreclosure on 
the mechanic’s lien.  
  Further, Jordan Construction did not execute that writ.  Instead, on June 14, 
2011, Jordan Construction filed a motion asking the court to supplement its 
findings and conclusions to include foreclosure on the mechanic’s lien.  (R.759-
60.)  The court granted that motion and ordered Jordan Construction to prepare a 
“new and revised Writ of Execution and Decree of Foreclosure.”  (R.888-91.)       
Jordan Construction did not prepare a new writ or a decree of foreclosure, 
as directed.  Nevertheless, at Jordan Construction’s request, on August 22, 2011, 
the Utah County Sheriff posted notice of a proposed foreclosure sale to take place 
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on September 14, 2011 of “[a]ll right, title, claim and interest of the above named 
plaintiff [i.e., Scott Bell] and his successor in interest” in the property.  (R.953.)  
This time, on September 6, 2011, having just acquired the trustee’s deed, FNMA 
did object and filed a motion to stop the sale.  (R.893-95.)   
In short, FNMA did not object to the first noticed sale, but that sale did not 
occur and had nothing to do with the mechanic’s lien at the center of this appeal.  
FNMA did object to the foreclosure sale.  Thus, FNMA did not somehow 
“waive” its right to object.      
B. The district court had discretion to quash the writ, cancel the 
foreclosure sale, and consider FNMA’s arguments.        
In any case, even if FNMA’s objection was somehow untimely, the district 
court still did not err in stopping the sheriff’s sale.  A district court has discretion 
to set aside a sheriff’s sale even after it has occurred (see Meguerditchian, 2012 UT 
App 176), so it surely has discretion to stop a sheriff’s sale from happening in the 
first place.  Jordan Construction asserts:  “The trial court’s order [quashing the 
writ] should be reversed.  In this instance, the trial court does not have 
discretion, and is bound when the parties fail to follow procedural rules.”  Aplt. 
Br. at 24.  Noticeably absent is any support for this assertion.  Jordan 
Construction cites no statute, rule, or case law that deprives the district court of 
discretion to quash a writ of execution or consider an untimely objection.   
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And to the contrary, there is authority for a court to quash a writ.  Rule 
54(b) says “any order or other decision, however designated … may be changed 
at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties.”  Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b).    
C. The writ should not have been issued in the first place because the 
trust deed holder was an indispensable party and no final 
judgment had been entered.   
And Jordan Construction itself had given the district court a reason to 
quash the writ and stop the foreclosure.  On August 5, 2010, Jordan Construction 
moved for permission to file a third-party complaint against FNMA’s 
predecessor in interest, MERS, because MERS was a “necessary and 
indispensable party” and joinder was “necessary in order to determine priority 
regarding liens which are attached to the property.”  (R.540-41.)  For whatever 
reason, Jordan Construction never served that complaint on MERS.  But Jordan 
Construction was right then and wrong now:  MERS (now FNMA) was an 
indispensable party.  Its interest could not be foreclosed in its absence.  
Additionally, the writ was issued under Rule 64E, but a writ is available 
under that provision only for “property in the possession or under the control of 
the defendant following entry of a final judgment or order ….”  Utah R. Civ. P. 
64E.  In this case, the property was no longer “in the possession or under the 
control” of Bell, and no final judgment had been entered.    
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The course taken by the district court was perfectly reasonable.  Jordan 
Construction prevailed against Bell and wanted to foreclose against his interest in 
the property.  The district court authorized that foreclosure but then learned, 
when FNMA objected, that Bell no longer had an interest in the property and 
that FNMA held a trustee’s deed on the property.  FNMA asked for the 
opportunity to contest the validity and priority of Jordan Construction’s lien over 
FNMA’s trustee’s deed, and the court wisely gave FNMA its day in court.   
And that is another key point.  By quashing the writ and cancelling the 
sale, the district court did not deprive Jordan Construction of anything.  It simply 
delayed foreclosure on the mechanic’s lien so that Jordan Construction could 
attempt to establish the validity and priority of its lien against the trustee’s deed 
held by FNMA, which otherwise would not have been affected by the 
foreclosure.  See Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2003 UT App 
283, ¶ 13 (“When the holder of a recorded interest is not joined in an action to 
foreclose, the foreclosure does nothing to affect its interest in the property.”).  If 
Jordan Construction had prevailed, or if it prevails on this appeal, it could still 
foreclose on its mechanic’s lien.  In any case, the district court did not commit 
reversible error when it quashed the writ and halted the foreclosure sale.             
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II. FNMA is not bound by the interlocutory rulings entered against Scott 
Bell in the first part of the case. 
 In the first part of this case, Jordan Construction prevailed on an 
unopposed motion for partial summary judgment against Scott Bell.  In the 
amended findings and conclusions, the court said Jordan Construction could 
foreclose on the mechanic’s lien and that it was entitled to prejudgment interest 
on the lien amount.  Jordan Construction argues that FNMA should be bound by 
those findings and conclusions and that it was error for the district court to even 
consider FNMA’s arguments on those issues.  Aplt. Br. at 24-33.  There are two 
parts of this argument.  First, Jordan Construction argues that FNMA is bound 
because of the lis pendens recorded on December 15, 2008, before FNMA acquired 
its interest, but after the trust deed was recorded.  Second, Jordan Construction 
argues that res judicata prohibits FNMA from relitigating the issues litigated by 
Bell.   
A. Jordan Construction’s third-party complaint against FNMA was a 
continuation of its action against Bell, not a separate action.  The 
district court was free to reconsider and revise orders and rulings 
made earlier in the action.  
 To have binding effect, a lis pendens and res judicata both require a final 
judgment in previous litigation.  That predicate is missing in this case.     
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Let’s start with the lis pendens issue.  “The recording of a lis pendens 
provides constructive notice to all persons that the rights and interests in the 
property at issue are controverted.  One who purchases property subject to a lis 
pendens acquires only the grantor’s interest therein, as determined by the outcome 
of the litigation.”  Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1392 (Utah 2006) (emphasis 
added); see also Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914, 916 (Utah 1978) 
(“One who acquires an interest in land that is the subject of the pending litigation 
… is charged with notice of the claimed contrary right of others, and he is bound 
by the judgment rendered in the litigation.”).   
 Jordan Construction argues:  “Because a lis pendens appeared in the chain 
of title to the property at the time FNMA purchased it, FNMA is charged with 
notice of the pending litigation, and is bound by the judgment rendered in the 
litigation.”  Aplt. Br. at 27 (emphasis added).  But no final judgment had been 
rendered so there was nothing to be bound by.4  If someone had purchased the 
property from Bell after final judgment had been entered, then, of course, the 
purchaser would have been bound by the judgment.  But if someone had 
                                                 
4 There was no final judgment for at least a couple of reasons.  First, Jordan 
Construction had obtained partial summary judgment against Scott Bell, but 
Todd Bell was still a party and the claims against him had not been resolved at 
this point.  Second, Jordan Construction had obtained partial summary judgment 
against Scott Bell, but that judgment had not been certified under Rule 54(b). 
Thus, the district court had not entered “final judgment.”     
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purchased the property from Bell while the litigation was pending, they could have 
stepped into Bell’s shoes in the litigation and pressed any arguments Bell could 
have made.  They still would have been bound by the eventual judgment; but 
they would not have been bound by interlocutory rulings at the time they 
entered the case unless such rulings later became part of the final judgment.  
FNMA was brought into Jordan Construction’s litigation against Bell as a third-
party defendant before final judgment had been entered.  And of course FNMA 
was bound by the eventual judgment that was entered—and is happy to be 
bound by that judgment.  It is Jordan Construction that is appealing that 
judgment, after all.  In short, the lis pendens is simply irrelevant.  
   Res judicata is inapplicable for a related reason.  It applies only when an 
issue has “been decided in a final judgment on the merits in the previous action.”  
Jones, Waldo, & Holbrook, 923 P.2d at 1370.  Here, there was no “final judgment” 
in a “previous action.”  See DFI Props. LLC v. GR 2 Enters. LLC, 2010 UT 61, ¶ 17 
(defining a final judgment as one that disposes of the case as to all the parties and 
as to the subject matter of the litigation).  The document Jordan Construction 
points to as the “judgment” against Bell is the amended findings and 
conclusions.  (See Aplt. Br. at 25 citing R.888.)  Findings and conclusions are not a 
final judgment.  See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A (“Every judgment and amended 
judgment must be set out in a separate document ordinarily titled ‘judgment’—
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or, as appropriate ‘Decree.’”).  To be sure, Jordan Construction won partial 
summary judgment against Bell, but until such a “judgment” is incorporated into 
a final judgment, it remains interlocutory and subject to reconsideration.      
In short, there is no “previous action” here, merely a continuation of the 
same action resulting in a single final judgment.  Jordan Construction 
unwittingly acknowledges this, arguing that res judicata prevents “re-litigation of 
the issues and claims even if, in hindsight, the trial court comes to some 
conclusions that differed from those reached in the first part of the case.”  Aplt. Br. 
at 32 (emphasis added).  “Res judicata and its companion, collateral estoppel, do 
not operate within a single case.  They are used to describe the binding effect of a 
decision in a prior case on a second case.”  In re Discipline of Rasmussen, 2013 UT 
14, ¶ 17 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original).  
Because the decisions Jordan Construction is appealing were made in the same 
case, res judicata is inapplicable.   
The applicable doctrine is the “law of the case.”  “Res judicata applies as 
between multiple cases while the law of the case doctrine applies to successive 
proceedings within one case.”  State v. Waterfield, 2014 UT App 67, ¶ 39 n.12.  
The distinction between the two is critical.  See also IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. 
D&K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 26 n. 20 (“Because the elements and effects of res 
judicata and law of the case may differ, they should be viewed as distinct 
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doctrines.”).  Res judicata bars relitigation of claims and issues resolved in a final 
judgment.  Law of the case allows reconsideration of issues and claims at any 
time before final judgment.  
 While a case remains pending before the district court prior to 
any appeal, the parties are bound by the court’s prior decision, but 
the court remains free to reconsider that decision.  It may do so sua 
sponte or at the suggestion of one of the parties….  As long as the 
case has not been appealed and remanded, reconsideration of an 
issue before a final judgment is within the sound discretion of the 
district court. 
Id., ¶ 27.   Indeed, Rule 54(b) expressly authorizes this.   See Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah App. 1988) (“Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does allow for the possibility of a judge changing 
his or her mind in cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims.”).       
 In sum, a lis pendens binds those who acquire the defendant’s interest in 
the property to the outcome of the litigation—i.e., the final judgment—but not to 
interlocutory rulings that may later be changed.  And res judicata binds privies to 
a final judgment in a prior case.  The prerequisite of both issues is a final 
judgment in an earlier case.  That requirement is absent here.   
B. Even if the findings and conclusions entered against Scott Bell 
were treated as a final judgment, only Bell’s interest, not FNMA’s, 
is bound by that judgment.            
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Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the “first part of this case” 
resulted in a final judgment against Scott Bell, that judgment could not 
determine FNMA’s separate interest in the property.  First, the lis pendens 
affected only Bell’s interest, not FNMA’s interest.  Second, because FNMA had a 
separate interest, there was no privity between FNMA and Bell.    
1. The lis pendens could not affect FNMA’s independent 
interest in the property.     
 A lis pendens affects the property interest that is “the subject of pending 
litigation.”  Bagnall, 579 P.2d at 916.  The trust deed was recorded against the 
property before Jordan Construction sued Bell.  But for whatever reason, Jordan 
Construction chose to name only Bell and not pursue foreclosure against the 
trust deed as well.  Thus, only Bell’s interest was at stake. 
If FNMA had purchased Bell’s interest in the property, which was subject 
to the trust deed, then that interest would have remained subject to the lis 
pendens and FNMA would have been bound by any final judgment.  But FNMA 
did not purchase Bell’s interest in the property.  It did not receive a deed from 
Bell.  It purchased the trustee’s deed as the successful purchaser at the trust deed 
foreclosure sale.  And a trustee’s deed maintains the same priority position the 
recorded trust deed had.  Utah Code § 57-1-28(3) provides: 
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The trustee’s deed shall operate to convey to the purchaser, without 
right of redemption, the trustee’s title and all right, title, interest, 
and claim of the trustor and the trustor’s successors in interest 
subsequent to the execution of the trust deed…. 
(emphasis added).5  Bell never held the “trustee’s title” that FNMA purchased.  
As the district court recognized, “having acquired the trustee’s lien, FNMA has 
an interest in and an ability to litigate the priority of the mechanics’ lien which 
Bell did not.  Thus, Bell did not represent the same legal right which FNMA now 
seeks to assert.”  (R.3223.) 
 Because Jordan Construction did not name the holder of the trust deed in 
its foreclosure action, the interest FNMA acquired was not at stake in Jordan 
Construction’s litigation against Bell, so the lis pendens has no impact on it.  
Again, Jordan Construction recognized this when it moved to add FNMA’s 
predecessor-in-interest, MERS, as a third-party defendant “in order to determine 
priority regarding” its separate interest.  (R.541.)  
 In short, there are two reasons why the lis pendens does not bind FNMA to 
the district court’s interlocutory rulings against Bell:  First, Bell’s interest had not 
                                                 
5 A trust deed is “a deed conveying title to real property to a trustee as security 
until the grantor repays a loan.”  Black’s Law Dictionary at 339 (7th ed. 
abridged).  The successful purchaser at a foreclosure sale on a trust deed receives 
the “trustee’s deed,” i.e., the “trustee’s title” to the property.  Utah Code § 57-1-
28(3).    
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been finally adjudicated when FNMA became a party.  Second, FNMA had its 
own interest in the property that was not at stake until FNMA became a party.      
2. Res judicata does not bind FNMA to the findings and 
conclusions entered against Bell because there was no 
privity between FNMA and Bell.       
 FNMA’s separate interest in the property is another reason why res judicata 
does not bind FNMA to the interlocutory rulings entered against Bell.  Both 
branches of res judicata require privity.  See Fundamentalist Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne, 2012 UT 66, ¶ 13 (claim preclusion); Jones, 
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Utah 1996) 
(issue preclusion).  Jordan Construction argues that “Bell had the same interest in 
the Property that FNMA has now.”  Aplt. Br. at 30.  But that’s not true.  Bell 
never held the trustee’s deed.  FNMA did not acquire its interest from Bell.  
Thus, as the district court explained, “Bell did not represent the same legal right 
which FNMA now seeks to assert.  There is no privity.”  (R.3223.) 
 In a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action, in order to claim priority over the 
trust deed and foreclose that interest, the holder of the trust deed must be named 
as a party.  “In other words, when seeking to foreclose a lien on property 
encumbered by a deed of trust, it is necessary to name the trustee who holds 
legal title to the property.”  ParkWest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 302 P.3d 18, 25 
(Idaho 2013).  See also Dunlap, 2003 UT App 283, ¶ 13 (“When the holder of a 
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recorded interest is not joined in an action to foreclose, the foreclosure does 
nothing to affect its interest in the property.”); Mickelson v. Anderson, 19 P.2d 
1033 (Utah 1932) (without title holder as a party foreclosure would be 
“ineffectual to convey any title … because the only person who had any title to 
the property was … not made a party to the suit”).             
 In short, there are at least two reasons why res judicata does not bind 
FNMA to the interlocutory rulings entered against Bell in the first part of this 
case.  First, there was no final judgment.  Thus, even if there was privity between 
FNMA and Bell, when FNMA stepped into Bell’s shoes, the court was free to 
revisit any of its prior orders and rulings.  Second, FNMA in fact did not step 
into Bell’s shoes but had its own separate interest in the property that could not 
have been affected by the interlocutory rulings against Bell.       
III. Jordan Construction is not entitled to collect prejudgment interest 
through foreclosure of its mechanic’s lien. 
 In 2012, the “Mechanic’s Liens” chapter of the Utah Code was 
renumbered, amended, and partially repealed.  The amended statutory scheme is 
found at Utah Code §§ 38-1a-101 to 38-1a-804 (2014).  “Because the 200[8] version 
of the code was in effect ‘at the time of the event regulated by the law in 
question,’” that version is applicable to this case.  2 Ton Plumbing, L.L.C. v. 
Thorgaard, 2015 UT 29, ¶ 11 n.1 quoting State v. Folsom, 2015 UT 14, ¶ 10.     
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The mechanic’s lien statute allows the lien claimant to recover “the value 
of the services rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished 
or rented ….”  Utah Code § 38-1-3 (2008).  This Court recently held that recovery 
through foreclosure is limited to these listed items.  In 2 Ton Plumbing, 2015 UT 
29, the plaintiff, 2 Ton, recorded a notice of lien representing only the value of 
services, labor, and materials.  Id., ¶ 3.  Later, 2 Ton “recorded an amended 
notice of mechanics’ lien” for $20,983.42 “‘consisting of principal of $7,147.41, 
plus lien fees of $110, plus interest and late fees of $2,480.30, plus pro rata costs of 
$942.44, plus pro rata attorney fees of $10,323.27 ….’”  Id., ¶ 9.  The property 
owners stipulated that the lien was valid for the original $7,147.41, but argued 
that the rest of the amended claim was invalid.  This Court agreed.   
The Court explained that “[a]ny reference to ‘attorney fees’ is noticeably 
absent from section 38-1-3’s statutory language, which sets forth ‘what may be 
attached in a lien claim,’” and is also absent “from section 38-1-7, which states 
the information that ‘shall’ be contained in the notice of lien.”  Id. at ¶ 34.  The 
same is true of interest.  This absence “was purposeful.” Id.  Had the legislature 
intended for these items “to be included in the value of a mechanics’ lien, it could 
have said so ….”6  Id.      
                                                 
6 The Court explained that attorney fees could be recovered, but not from the 
property:  “Section 38-1-18 provides that if a lien claimant elects to enforce the 
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Things changed in 2012 when the Legislature amended the law to 
expressly allow prejudgment interest on a mechanic’s lien claim.  See Utah Code 
§ 38-1a-309 (added by Chapter 330, 2012 General Session, § 7 eff. May 8, 2012).  
As the district court said:  “[S]ince 2012, Section 15-1-1 has acted to apply the 
same statutory interest rate to mechanics’ liens as applies to contracts.  That the 
Legislature saw fit to amend the mechanics’ lien statutes to allow for recovery of 
interest strongly suggests that interest was not awardable previously.”  (R.3221.) 
Before this amendment, as this Court held, a mechanics’ lien was “limited 
to ‘the value of the services rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented.’”  2 Ton Plumbing, 2015 UT 29 ¶ 39.  And as the 
Court pointed out, this is consistent with case law in other jurisdictions.  In 
Artsmith Devel. Group, Inc. v. Updegraff, 868 A.2d 495 (Pa. Super. 2005), the 
court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that interest was “not properly the 
subject of a mechanic’s lien claim.”  Id. at 496.  The statute, the court said, 
“expressly limits the lien to amounts owed for labor and materials only.”  Id.  In 
Nat’l Lumber Co. v. United Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co., Inc., 802 N.E.2d 82, 87 (Mass. 
                                                                                                                                                             
mechanics’ lien, ‘the successful part shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorneys’ fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action.’  
This provision clarifies that an award of attorney fees is a conditional award that 
depends upon the outcome of the action to enforce the lien.  Pursuant to section 
38-1-18, a ‘successful party’ must be ascertained before a lien claimant is entitled 
to attorney fees.”  Id. ¶ 35 (footnote omitted).    
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2004), the court likewise applied the plain language of Massachusetts’ mechanic’s 
lien statutes to deny interest.   
The plain wording of G.L. c. 254 limits a mechanic’s lien 
created pursuant to § 4 to the amount due for labor and materials…. 
Nowhere in the detailed statutory framework is there a reference to 
interest or attorney’s fees.  Contractual interest and attorney’s fees 
are not “labor and material,” nor can they be part of the “amount 
due” at the time the statement of claim is filed because they have not 
yet been determined. 
Id. at 86.     
 Jordan Construction argues that the trial court’s ruling “simply ignores the 
statutory pre-judgment interest rate set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1” which 
“provides for a default statutory prejudgment interest rate of 10% per annum for 
claims arising from the forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action.”  
Aplt. Br. at 34.  But Utah Code 15-1-1(2) “does nothing more than define what the 
rate of interest should be in those instances where interest accrues as a matter of 
law but no specific rate has been agreed to; it does not create a right to interest 
where none otherwise exists.”  Vali Convalescent & Care Inst. v. Div. of Health 
Care Fin., 797 P.2d 438, 445 (Utah 1990).  Only if a party “is entitled to interest on 
some valid basis” does § 15-1-1 “establish[ ] the rate of interest to which it is 
entitled.”  Id.     
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Jordan Construction argues that the trial court’s ruling “ignored the fact 
that Utah courts have awarded pre-judgment interest at the statutory rate on 
mechanic’s lien cases in the past” and cites Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 
1979), in support.  But Lignell was not a mechanic’s lien case.  It was a breach-of-
contract case and the court awarded interest on the contract claim.  “In contract 
cases, certainly, interest on amounts found to be due in judicial proceedings is 
recovery to which the creditor is entitled as a matter of law.”  Id. at 809. 
And that is a critical distinction.  Jordan Construction is entitled to 
prejudgment interest on the money Bell owes.  But that prejudgment interest 
must be collected from Bell, not from the property to which the mechanic’s lien is 
attached.  See Artsmith Devel. Group, Inc., 868 A.2d at 496-97 (“Items other than 
labor and materials are more properly sought in an action for breach of the 
construction contract, if that contract authorizes recovery of interest and 
attorneys’ fees.”).  The confusion comes from Jordan Construction’s erroneous 
belief that a “mechanic’s lien claim is one that necessarily arises from contract 
and the payment of past due money … and fits squarely within … Utah Code 
Ann. 15-1-1.” Aplt. Br. at 35.  The right to recover from a mechanic’s lien is 
statutory, not contractual.  Foreclosure on a mechanic’s lien is an in rem action 
against the property, not an in personam action to enforce a contractual right.  As 
one court has said, “[a] lien is asserted against property, not against a person.”  
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Kehoe Component Sales, Inc. v. Best Lighting Pods., Inc., 796 F.3d 576, 593 (6th 
Cir. 2015).  “The contractual relationship between the property owner and the 
holder of the lien is not relevant to whether the lien may be enforced because ‘the 
entitlement to enforce a … lien arises as a matter of law and not from a written 
instrument or verbal contract.’”  Id. (quoting Guernsey Bank v. Milano Sports 
Ents., LLC, 894 N.E.2d 715, 732 (Ohio App. 2008); see also Nat’l Lumber Co., 802 
N.E.2d at 88 (“National Lumber claims that it is entitled to statutory interest 
pursuant to G.L. c. 231 §§ 6C and 6H.  Neither of these provisions is applicable in 
[a mechanic’s lien foreclosure] case because the nature of the plaintiff’s action is 
in rem, to enforce a lien.”). 
Similarly, in Guernsey Bank, 894 N.E.2d 715, the court explained that in a 
mechanic’s lien action the “right to recovery [is] not based upon a written 
instrument or verbal contract” but “ar[ises] from the mechanic’s lien statute and 
[goes] against the property only.”  Id.  This is plain, for example, when a 
subcontractor recovers on a mechanic’s lien.  Prejudgment interest would not be 
available “because there [is] no privity of contract between the subcontractor and 
the owner of the property ….”  Id.  Foreclosure on a mechanic’s lien is a 
proceeding “in rem not in personam.”  Id.  That is, it is not a contract action to 
enforce personal rights between parties to a contract, but an action against the 
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property to recover a debt owed by some third party who may not be a party to a 
contract.    
[W]henever a holder of a mechanic’s lien enforces its lien in court, it 
recovers against the property based upon a statutorily granted right.  
Although some holders may also have contractual actions against 
the property owner, foreclosure on a mechanic’s lien does not 
implicate any contractual right to recovery.  As the entitlement to 
enforce a mechanic’s lien arises as a matter of law and not from a 
written instrument or verbal contract, holders of mechanic’s liens 
cannot receive prejudgment interest …. 
Id. at 732. 
 In sum, as this Court made clear in 2 Ton Plumbing, the amount of the lien 
is limited to “the value of the services rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented ….”  Utah Code § 38-1-3 (2009).        
IV. The second amendment to the mechanic’s lien was untimely.   
 The parties agree that the timeliness of the second amendment to the 
mechanic’s lien is determined by the date a certificate of occupancy was issued.  
See Utah Code § 38-1-7(1)(a)(ii) (2008).  If a certificate of occupancy was issued in 
October 2008, as Jordan Construction once admitted, then the second 
amendment was untimely and thus of no validity.   
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A. Refusing to allow Jordan Construction to withdraw its admission 
that the certificate of occupancy was issued in October 2008 was 
not an abuse of discretion.   
  The primary question on appeal is not, however, when a certificate of 
occupancy was issued—at least not directly.  Jordan Construction admitted it was 
issued in October 2008.  (R.2541.)  The question on appeal is whether the trial 
court abused its discretion by refusing to allow Jordan Construction to withdraw 
that admission.   
 On February 1, 2013, in response to a request for admission, Jordan 
Construction admitted that a Certificate of Occupancy was issued in October 
2008.  (R.2541).  “Any matter admitted under [Rule 36] is conclusively 
established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the 
admission.”  Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b).  Rule 36(c) states that “[t]he Court may permit 
withdrawal or amendment if [1] the presentation of the merits of the action will 
be promoted and [2] withdrawal or amendment will not prejudice the requesting 
party.”  Both conditions must be met before an admission can be withdrawn.  
“The trial court has discretion to deny a motion to amend, but its discretion to 
grant such a motion comes into play only after the preliminary requirements are 
satisfied.” Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1062 (Utah 1998).  
In this case, the district court correctly concluded that neither condition was met 
and, in any case, did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion.    
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1. Allowing Jordan Construction to withdraw the admission 
would not have served presentation of the merits because 
the admission was consistent with the undisputed facts. 
To withdraw an admission, a party must “(1) show that the matters 
deemed admitted against it are relevant to the merits of the underlying cause of 
action, and (2) introduce some evidence by affidavit or otherwise of specific facts 
indicating that the matters deemed admitted against it are in fact untrue.”  Id. at 
1062.  The issue is relevant.  That’s never been disputed.  “[T]he burden of 
showing the truth or falsity of admissions should not … fall on the party that 
obtained the admissions but rather on the party seeking to amend or withdraw 
them.”  Id. The district court denied the motion to withdraw because the 
“documentary evidence, together with deposition testimony and interrogatories 
all consistently demonstrate that the certificate of occupancy was, in fact, issued 
in 2008,” i.e., the admission was true.  (R.3809.)       
The evidence is undisputed that Bell moved into the home before it was 
finished and on March 18, 2008, Provo City recorded against the property a 
“Certificate of Non-compliance,” which stated that the property “has been 
occupied without an approved final [inspection] and a Certificate of Occupancy 
issued from the Provo City Building Department.”  (R.3388.)  Provo City Code § 
14.01.090 provides:  “It shall be unlawful to use or occupy … any building or 
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premises until a Certificate of Occupancy … shall have been issued for the 
premises … by Provo City.”  But the home was finished, a final inspection was 
done, and on October 21, 2008, the City recorded a “Certificate of Compliance,” 
which stated: “As of October 21, 2008, the project passed the Final Inspection.  A 
Certificate of Occupancy has been issued.  Therefore the Certificate of Non 
Compliance is no longer valid.”  (R.3388.)  In other words, it was now legal for 
Bell to live there because a certificate of occupancy had been issued.     
Jordan Construction’s owner, Wesley Lewis, confirmed as a 30(b)(6) 
witness that the final inspection where the home was “passed off” occurred in 
October 2008 and that no work was done after that.  (R.2535-36.)  “There were a 
few miscellaneous things that I got fixed, and I called for a final inspection, for 
the city to come out and do a final final, because they had hounded me at this 
point to get this permit cleared up and in compliance.”  (R.2536.)  He explained 
that this work was done, that the home passed final inspection, and that he saw a 
document from the city saying it was in compliance.   
Q. And at some point the city – I’ve seen a document from 
the city where they eventually say, in compliance, and it essentially 
appears to be closed out. 
A. In October, yeah. 
(R.3458.) As the district court pointed out, Utah law provides that a recorded 
notice that a certificate of occupancy had been issued creates a presumption that 
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it actually has been issued.  “A recorded document creates the … presumption[ 
]” that the “recitals and other statements of fact in a document including without 
limitation recitals concerning mergers or name changes of organizations, are 
true.”  Utah Code § 57-4a-4(1)(j).  “Thus, there is a statutory presumption,” the 
district court explained, “that the Property passed final inspection, and a 
certificate of occupancy was thereafter issued in October of 2008.”  (R.3949-50.)  
“This presumption,” the court said, “is further supported by deposition 
testimony, affidavit testimony, and discovery responses, all of which point to the 
existence of an October 2008 certificate of occupancy.” (R.3950.)   
Further, the Provo City Code required that the certificate of occupancy be 
issued in October 2008, when the home passed final inspection.  “A Certificate of 
Occupancy … is required to be issued by the Planning Commission of Provo City 
at the time a building is completed and final inspection granted by the Building 
Inspection Division.”  Provo City Code § 14.01.090(2).  There is no explanation 
for why a certificate of occupancy would not have been issued in October 2008.  
Thus, the district court concluded, “Jordan has failed to demonstrate that the 
admitted fact is untrue.”  (R.3949-50.) 
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2. Allowing Jordan Construction to withdraw the admission 
would have prejudiced FNMA.   
“[F]ailure [by the moving party] to satisfy the first requirement of rule 
36(b) relieves [the nonmoving party] of the burden of showing [prejudice].”  
Langeland, 952 P.2d at 1061.  Thus, there’s no reason to consider prejudice.  In 
any case, the district court also correctly found that FNMA would be prejudiced 
by withdrawal of the admission.  The test “is whether the party is now any less 
able to obtain the evidence required to prove the matter which was admitted 
than he would have been at the time the admission was made.”  Id. at 1063 
(quotation marks omitted). 
Jordan Construction admitted, not only in its formal admission, but from 
the very beginning of this case, that the second amendment to the mechanic’s 
lien occurred after the statutory time period for amending the lien had expired.  
The original Third Party Complaint filed against FNMA admitted that it paid off 
subcontractors and then amended its lien “[a]fter the six month period in which 
other subcontractors could assert a lien on the Property had expired ….”  
(R.1051.)  And in four separate summary judgment memoranda, Jordan 
Construction repeatedly acknowledged that the amendment was untimely.  
(R.2585; 2588; 2683; 2686; 2854-55; 2858.)    
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Rather than contend that the second amendment was timely, Jordan 
Construction made three other arguments:  (1) FNMA should be bound by the 
findings against Bell—who had never raised the timeliness issue, (R.2690-98); (2) 
the amendment should relate back to the original lien under Rule 15 (R.2689-90); 
and (3) the untimeliness should be overlooked under the doctrine of substantial 
compliance (R.2688-89).  But Jordan Construction did not move to withdraw its 
admission or otherwise argue that the second amendment was timely.   
On April 15, 2014, Jordan Construction even attached the June 2011 
certificate of occupancy as an exhibit to its motion for summary judgment.  In 
fact, it is attached twice.  (R.2949; 2955.)  Yet, Jordan Construction still continued 
to admit that the second amendment was untimely.  One of the undisputed facts 
in support of this motion stated:  “On or about July 27, 2009, after the six month 
period in which other subcontractors could assert mechanic’s liens on the 
Property had expired … Jordan Construction … recorded a Second Amended 
Notice of Mechanic’s Lien.”  (R.2858.)  FNMA’s opposition admitted that this fact 
was undisputed.  (R.3122.)   
In short, from the time Jordan Construction filed its Third Party Complaint 
against FNMA in September 2011, through June 2014, it was an undisputed fact 
that the second amendment was filed after the allowed statutory period had 
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expired.  Hence, there was no discovery into this issue.  No Provo City officials 
were deposed.  No one even mentioned the June 2011 certificate of occupancy.     
That changed at an oral argument on various motions for summary 
judgment on June 23, 2014, when Jordan Construction brought the June 2011 
certificate of occupancy to the court’s attention and argued for the first time that 
the second amendment was timely because it was recorded within 180 days of 
this certificate.  (R.3204; 3219-20.)  But even then Jordan Construction did not 
move to withdraw or amend its admission.  That was not done until April 6, 
2015—26 months after making the admission, more than a year after fact 
discovery closed, and six-and-a-half years after the case was originally filed.  
(R.3474-75.)  Trial was scheduled for August (R.3814) and Jordan Construction 
was now seeking to withdraw its admission and reopen discovery (R.3813-19).            
The district court concluded that allowing withdrawal of the admission at 
this late stage, after years of failing to raise the issue, would prejudice FNMA.  “If 
the date of the certificate of occupancy were now declared to be an open 
question,” the court explained, “FNMA would be left attempting to depose 
witnesses in order to confirm” that a certificate of occupancy was in fact issued in 
2008.  (R.3810.)  Given the seven years that had passed, “it seems unlikely that 
any witness would be equipped” to say what had happened to the 2008 
certificate.  (R.3810.)  No discovery was conducted because the fact had been 
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admitted.  “To retract that admission now would clearly cause prejudice to 
FNMA.”  (R.3810.)   
 There is no conceivable reason why a certificate of occupancy would have 
been issued in 2011 (unless it was a replacement for a lost certificate) and not in 
2008.  But the passage of time would clearly complicate FNMA’s efforts to prove 
that.  No Provo City official is going to remember what happened to a certificate 
of occupancy in 2008.  Prejudice can be presumed merely from the passage of 
time.  See Young v. W. Piling & Sheeting, 680 P.2d 394, 395 (Utah 1984) (“The 
prejudice and disadvantage to the defendant is readily apparent. Some witnesses 
may no longer be available; recollections may be dimmed. Valuable evidence 
may have long been discarded or destroyed.”); Kuhn v. Mount, 44 P. 1036, 1038 
(Utah 1896) (imposing a time bar where “the transaction has faded from 
memory, or the evidence has been lost”).   
Moreover, prejudice exists where a motion to withdraw is made after fact 
discovery is closed and a previously uncontested fact is being challenged.  See 
also See Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 2007) (nonmoving 
party was prejudiced where motion to withdraw admission was not filed until 
two-and-a-half months after fact discovery was closed); Pedroza v. Lomas Auto 
Mall, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 453 (D.N.M. 2009) (prejudiced where understanding 
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throughout the case was consistent with admissions and the request to withdraw 
was post-discovery and on the eve of trial).    
 In short, before the district court could even exercise its discretion to allow 
Jordan Construction to withdraw its admission, the burden was on Jordan 
Construction to show that the admission was untrue.  Jordan Construction did 
not meet that burden.  The district court also correctly concluded that 
withdrawal would prejudice FNMA.  The “preliminary determination as to 
whether the rule 36(b) conditions have been met ‘is subject to a somewhat more 
exacting standard of review’” than mere abuse of discretion.  Barnes v. Clarkson, 
2008 UT App 44, ¶ 12 quoting Langeland, 952 P.2d at 1060-61.  The district 
court’s decision survives even this “somewhat more exacting” abuse-of-
discretion review. 
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
allow Jordan Construction to withdraw its admission.  
 As noted, a trial court has discretion to grant a motion to withdraw only if 
the preliminary 36(b) requirements are satisfied, but it has discretion to deny 
withdrawal regardless of those requirements.   Langeland, 952 P.2d at 1060-61.  
“Decisions placed within the discretion of the trial court can be reversed only 
upon a finding of abuse of discretion, i.e., if there is no reasonable basis for the 
decision.”  Id. at 1061.  In this case, there was plainly a reasonable basis.  
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 First, it is undisputed that work on the home was completed in October 
2008, a final inspection was done, the Notice of Noncompliance was revoked, 
and a document was recorded stating:  “A Certificate of Occupancy has been 
issued.”  (R.3388.)  Jordan Construction’s admission was consistent with these 
undisputed facts.      
 Further, this case was litigated for nearly three years (including 26 months 
after the admission) without Jordan Construction ever contending that the 
second amendment to the lien was timely.  And Jordan Construction had plenty 
of opportunities.  The June 2011 certificate of occupancy was obtained by FNMA 
on July 2, 2013, and quickly provided to Jordan Construction.  Jordan 
Construction submitted it to the district court as an exhibit in April 2014, but still 
did not move to withdraw its earlier admission. 
 Additionally, by the time Jordan Construction finally did move to 
withdraw the admission, discovery was long over and trial was approaching.  
The district court was not willing to reopen discovery.  (R.3816.)    “Based upon 
this procedural history, the Court concludes that Jordan’s attempt to delay 
consideration of summary judgment and re-open discovery to investigate an 
issue which all parties have been aware of since 2013 is not timely.”  (R.3816.)  
The court added that Defendant “has had literally years to investigate” the issue 
“but has inexplicably waited until now to seek additional discovery.”  (R.3817.) 
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 Finally, this case was already more than six years old when this issue was 
raised.  As this Court said in Langeland, “[]itigation must come to an end 
sometime,” and the rules of civil procedure are intended help that happen.  Id. at 
1064.  Thus, a court does not have to “come to the rescue of a party” that admits 
a fact and then waits too long to withdraw that admission.  Id.      
 For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Jordan Construction’s motion to withdraw its admission.7    
B. Equitable tolling does not save the untimeliness of the second 
amendment to the mechanic’s lien.  
 Jordan Construction next attempts to save the untimely second 
amendment to its mechanic’s lien through the doctrine of equitable tolling.   
  1. Jordan Construction did not raise this argument below. 
 In the district court, Jordan Construction raised three arguments to try to 
overcome the untimeliness of the second amendment to the lien:  (1) res judicata, 
                                                 
7 Jordan Construction argues that it should have been allowed to withdraw or 
amend its admission because the admission at issue was not directly responsive 
to the request it was responding to.  Aplt. Br. at 46.  The district court correctly 
rejected this argument because “nowhere in Rule 36 does it suggest that an 
answer must be an unqualified ‘yes’ or no,’” rather, the rule “clearly allows 
parties to admit in part, deny in part, and provide details.”  (R.3811.)  Jordan’s 
response was “permissible under Rule 36, and there is no basis to strike the 
language now, simply because Jordan regrets including it.”  (R.3811.) Plus, this 
argument ignores the numerous other admissions throughout the case that the 
second amendment was untimely.   
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(2) substantial compliance, and (3) relation back.  The equitable tolling argument 
was not raised.  Because Jordan Construction “never raised this argument 
below,” it has “waived [its] right to urge its consideration on appeal.”  State v. 
Martin, 2002 UT 34, ¶ 28 n.4.   
2. Equitable tolling does not apply to mechanic’s lien statutory 
deadlines.  
Even if the argument was not waived, equitable tolling does not apply to 
amending a mechanic’s lien.  “A lien created solely by statute depends on the 
terms of the statute.”  2 Ton Plumbing, 2015 UT 29, ¶ 21.  Thus, “compliance with 
the statute is required before a party is entitled to the benefits created by the 
statute.”  AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Devel. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291 
(Utah 1986).  In AAA Fencing, the lien claimant brought its foreclosure action 
after the statutory period for doing so had expired, but argued that the defendant 
had waived that defense by not pleading it.  Id. at 290-91.  The court rejected the 
argument and held that lien claimants lose their lien if they fail to file the 
foreclosure action within the required time.  The court “distinguish[ed] 
mechanics’ lien statutory periods from procedural statutes of limitations,” which 
would be subject to waiver and tolling.  Id. at 291.  “[T]he statutory period is not 
merely a statute of limitations but a condition of liability itself ….”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
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The time for filing and amending a lien is set by express statutory 
command.  See Utah Code § 38-1-7(1)(a)(i)(A).  Thus, “notices of liens may not be 
amended in any substantial manner after the time has expired for the filing of the 
same.”  Roberts Inv. Co. v. Gibbons & Reed Concrete Prod. Co., 449 P.2d 116, 118 
(Utah 1969).  “Unless authorized by statute, a mechanic’s lien claim or statement 
may not be amended after the expiration of the time for filing.”  56 C.J.S. 
Mechanics’ Liens § 193; see also 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics’ Liens § 231 (“In the 
absence of a statute providing for an amendment, a mechanic’s lien claim or 
notice required to be made and filed cannot be materially amended, and it must 
be complete and legally sufficient when filed and it cannot even be reformed in 
equity.”).     
Further, there is no basis for equitable tolling.  Jordan Construction was 
not deceived.  It timely filed a lien for the amount it was owed.  The untimely 
amendment was for amounts owed to subcontractors.  Some had timely filed 
liens.  Jordan Construction paid those subcontractors, released their liens, and 
added the amount to its own lien.  Others chose not to file a lien for whatever 
reason.  But there is no evidence they were deceived.  And nothing in the 
mechanic’s lien statutes allows a contractor to untimely amend its lien after 
paying off a subcontractor.     
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In short, the equitable tolling argument was waived, does not apply to 
mechanic’s liens in any case, and would not be applicable in this case even if it 
did apply to mechanic’s liens.     
C. The “relation back” rule does not apply to mechanic’s liens.  
Finally, Jordan Construction argues that the untimely amendment should 
relate back under rule 15(c) to the original notice of lien.  Aplt. Br. at 42-43.  Rule 
15(c) says that a “claim or defense asserted in [an] amended pleading … relates 
back to the date of the original pleading” if it “arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth … in the original pleading.”  Utah R. Civ. P. 
15(c).  An amendment to a mechanic’s lien is not a new “claim or defense” in an 
“amended pleading” and there is no “original pleading” for it to relate back to.  
See Utah R. Civ. P. 7.   
And the mechanic’s lien statute does not provide for relation back of an 
amended notice of lien.  Utah courts “will not infer substantive terms into the 
text [of a statute] that are not already there.” Associated Gen. Contractors v. Bd. 
of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, ¶30 (quotations and citation omitted).  
Further, “relation back” would conflict with the strict deadlines set forth in the 
carefully crafted mechanic’s lien statutes. 
 * * * * * 
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 For all these reasons, the second amendment to Jordan Construction’s 
mechanic’s lien was untimely and the district court properly granted summary 
judgment in FNMA’s favor on this issue.   
V. The district court’s conclusion that FNMA was the “prevailing party” 
and award of attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion.   
 The mechanic’s lien chapter requires fees to be awarded to the prevailing 
party.  “[I]n any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the 
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys’ fee, to be 
fixed by the court.”  Utah Code § 38-1-18(1).   
A. The district court considered the context and correctly concluded 
that FNMA was the successful party.  
“[T]rial courts should, as permitted by statute and other applicable law, 
use their common sense in deciding whether a party was ‘successful’ in bringing 
or defending against a mechanic’s lien enforcement action.”  A.K.&R. Whipple 
Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 2004 UT 47, ¶ 26.  This approach 
“requires not only consideration of the significance of the net judgment in the 
case, but also looking at the amounts actually sought and then balancing them 
proportionally with what was recovered.”  Id.  A court is free to use its common 
sense given each case’s “unique circumstances.”  Id.  “This approach ensures that 
only parties that are genuinely ‘successful’ according to the trial court’s common 
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sense logic will be able to extract their attorney fees from their opponents.”  J. 
Pochynok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud, 2005 UT 39, ¶ 20.   
The district court has significant discretion because the issue “depends, to 
a large measure, on the context of each case ….  We therefore review the trial 
court’s determination as to who was the prevailing party under an abuse of 
discretion standard.”  R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ¶ 25.  
Jordan Construction asserts it was the prevailing party because “the 
parties stipulated to judgment in favor of Jordan Construction and an award of 
damages in the amount of $126,956.92” which was “54% of the $232,976.81 listed 
on the face of the Second Amended Lien.”  Aplt. Br. at 49.  The district court 
called Jordan Construction’s partial “victory” a “pyrrhic one.”  (R.4485.)  It’s true 
that on the face of the lien after its second amendment, the amount requested 
was $232,976.81, but “Jordan brought FNMA into this litigation with a claim of 
$336,568.66,” which was the amount awarded against Scott Bell, and Jordan 
Construction also requested interest on this amount.  (R.4485.)  “Through its 
litigation strategy,” the district court explained, “FNMA has forced Jordan to 
retreat into its present position and resolve this case with a settlement of 
$126,956.92.”  (R.4485.)  Moreover, what Jordan Construction got in the end was 
less than the $130,000 offer of judgment that Jordan rejected.  (R.4137-38.)    
“After this degree of success, requiring FNMA to pay attorney fees as the losing 
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party lacks the common sense the flexible and reasoned approach is intended to 
apply.”  (R.4485.)   
Moreover, as the district court pointed out, Jordan Construction did not try 
to enforce the original amount if its lien until the very end of the case.  (R.4482-
83.)   And even then, Jordan did not prevail on any motion or win any argument.  
A party is not entitled to recover fees incurred on issues resolved in the other 
party’s favor.  Mountain States Broad Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 566 n.10 (Utah 
App. 1989).  See also Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). The 
district court expressed surprise when Jordan requested attorney fees “because 
the court does not know what work Jordan Construction is suggesting was done 
in order to prevail” on that portion of its lien.  (R.4302-03.)    
FNMA, in contrast, prevailed on almost every motion and successfully 
reduced the amount Jordan Construction was seeking from $336,568.66 to 
$126,956.92 before stipulating to that amount.  And the stipulation was not a 
concession that Jordan Construction would win anyway.  The district court had 
found that there were disputed issues of material fact about whether Jordan 
Construction had abandoned construction for a time, which would have 
prevented their lien from relating back to the commencement of the work.  
(R.3224-25.)  But given the amount at stake, the expense of trial, and FNMA’s 
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anticipation that it would recover its fees, it simply chose not to press the 
argument.        
The district court properly focused “on which party had attained a 
‘comparative victory,’ considering what total victory would have meant for each 
party and what a true draw would look like.”  J. Pochynok Co., 2005 UT 39, ¶ 11.  
It’s conclusion that FNMA was the successful party was not an abuse of 
discretion.         
B. Jordan Construction failed to timely submit an affidavit in 
support of its request for fees.   
 The district court correctly rejected Jordan Construction’s request for fees 
not only because FNMA was the overall successful party, but because Jordan 
Construction failed to submit a timely affidavit, even after being given an 
extension.    
CONCLUSION 
   This Court should hold that the holder of a trust deed is an indispensable 
party to any mechanic’s lien foreclosure action that seeks to remove the 
encumbrance posed by the trust deed.  “In other words, when seeking to 
foreclose a [mechanic’s] lien on property encumbered by a deed of trust, it is 
necessary to name the trustee who holds legal title to the property.”  ParkWest 
Homes, LLC, 302 P.3d at 25.  Had Jordan Construction named FNMA’s 
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predecessor-in-interest as a party from the outset, Jordan Construction would 
have been in a position to assert the priority of its lien over the trust deed, and 
the trust deed holder would have been in a position to protect its interests.  
Instead, Jordan Construction obtained summary judgment against Bell, and then 
tried (and is still trying) to use that summary judgment to bind the separate trust 
deed interest.  That is plainly not permissible.  Thus, the district court did not err 
by refusing to bind FNMA to the interlocutory rulings issued against Bell and by 
requiring Jordan Construction to make FNMA a party in order to claim priority 
over FNMA’s trustee’s deed.    
 Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Jordan 
Construction to withdraw its admission.  Discovery was long over, trial was 
approaching, and the admission was consistent with the undisputed facts. 
 The district court also correctly concluded that prejudgment interest is not 
available on a mechanic’s lien.  That holding was confirmed by this Court in the 
2 Ton case.   
 Finally, the district court’s decision to award attorney’s fees to FNMA was 
also well within its discretion.  FNMA prevailed on almost very motion and 
successfully whittled away at Jordan Construction’s mechanic’s lien claim until it 
was worth only about one third of what it first sought.   
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 FNMA asks this Court to affirm the judgment of the Fourth District Court 
and award FNMA its fees for this appeal.    
DATED this 11th day of November, 2016. 
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